



Religion and the Philosophy of Life

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CHAPTER

10 Bare Life and the Resurrection of the Body

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Abstract

Vital materialism imbues life with positive value and interfaces with environmentalism. But there is another kind of vitalism in which the political colonizes life in a way that brings into question the value of life itself and brings life into proximity with nihilism. We might call this a dark vitalism, which we see emerging in the European body politic in the twentieth century. While this stream of thought can be read as an attempt to heal the past through creating a utopian and messianic future, it nevertheless negates the values of life and undermines its healing project because fundamentally locked into a form of nihilism, thereby negating life-affirming values. By contrast, spiritual philosophies of life offer a counter-narrative to the dark vitalism that has held such a grip on nations in the last hundred years.

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I here want to take up a theme from Chapter 6 and following from Chapter 9, namely the question of political theology in relation to the philosophy of life.¹ As we have seen, Taubes characterized Paul's theology as transforming the bran from Moses into the food of angels and humans, thereby instituting a 'catholic', that is universal, view of subjectivity. The physical *pneuma* as the animating force of life becomes transformed into a theology relevant to both the bodies of the faithful and the wider polis. Paul's vision is both eschatological and political, a vision that shapes Christianity into a project inseparably political in its orientation, in spite of an incipient Gnostic narrative within it and in spite of the separation of church and state from an early period. The philosophies of life that we have examined, and the life force as a theme within the history of religions, have tended to present life itself as transcendent to political concerns. But throughout the history of Christianity the life force as spirit (*pneuma*) or Geist has impacted upon formations of the political, especially in Hegel, as we have seen, although it has been played down in the subsequent history of Hegelianism in which Marx's materialist reading feeds into the Frankfurt School with little regard for the idea of life itself.

In this penultimate chapter I wish to bring the narrative into modern times and unpack the somewhat complex relationship between the philosophy of life and Christian theology, with an emphasis on political

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theology in particular. On the one hand, in a secular context, the philosophy of life becomes, as we saw in Chapter 9, a vital materialism that imbues life with positive value and interfaces with environmentalism. But there is another kind of vitalism in which the political colonizes life in a way that brings into question the value of life itself and brings life into proximity with nihilism. We might call this a dark vitalism, which we see emerging in the European body politic in the twentieth century with National Socialism, so astutely analysed by Agamben, but whose roots are much older. While this stream of thought, like all vitalisms, can be read as an attempt to heal the past through creating a utopian and messianic future, and so is a form of human self-repair, it nevertheless negates the values of life and undermines its healing project because fundamentally locked into a form of nihilism, thereby negating life-affirming values. In contrast to this, spiritual philosophies of life (and I would include the environmentalist imperative here) have a view of material life imbued with meaning and higher-order value and offer a counter-narrative to the dark vitalism that has held such a grip on nations in the last hundred years. This dark vitalism is the embodiment of sovereign power and antithetical to the spirit of vitalism that we found in Paul. That impulse, by contrast, comes to be articulated in the twentieth century by a number of theologians including de Lubac and Rahner in Catholicism and Barth and Milbank in Protestant theology, and we see it coming to articulation in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body and Christ's ascension to heaven; even Teilhard de Chardin's theology, which is positively vitalist but not overtly political, offers implicit critique of dark vitalism. Agamben's analysis of bare life is relevant here in arguing for what he regards as the inextricably political nature of life itself and the twentieth-century response to bare life in 'the camp'.

Dark Vitalism

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Agamben begins with the Greek distinction between *zoē* and *bios*; both words translate 'life', the former being a purely physical entity, a quality common to all living beings, the latter being 'the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group'. Thus, Aristotle could speak of the life of the philosopher (*bios theōrētikos*), the life of pleasure (*bios apolaustikos*), and the political life (*bios politikos*).² *Zoē*, when it enters into the polis, is the politicization of bare life as such that according to Agamben 'constitutes the decisive event of modernity'.³ Natural life comes to be the focus of sovereign power; the management of biological life and its colonization by the political. In itself *zoē* is prior to or outside language in contrast to *bios*, which is in language. Bare life (*nuda vita*) is the politicization of biological life, of the non-linguistic *zoē*. Agamben then links this with law and sovereign power, following Carl Schmitt, as that which defines the state of the exception (Schmitt's *Ausnahmezustand*). On this model, law speaks through sovereign power that can define what is and is not an exception to it. Furthermore, in Roman law, this is associated with the 'sacred man' (*homo sacer*) as he who can be killed but not sacrificed. This is not only to see sacredness as something set aside, as Durkheim would have it, but as constituted within a legal system that retains its deep ambivalence as both wholesome and polluting. The man who can be killed without committing murder, but cannot be sacrificed, is a liminal figure, an outcast in law who is the exception. As such the sovereign himself is that figure. This absorption of the sacred into the judicial order is simultaneously the absorption of bare life or the politicization of biological life. Agamben writes:

If our hypothesis is correct, sacredness is ... the originary form of the inclusion of bare life in the juridical order, and the syntagm *homo sacer* names something like the originary 'political' relation, which is to say, bare life in so far as it operates in an inclusive exclusion as the referent of sovereign decision. Life is sacred only in so far as it is taken into the sovereign exception, and to have exchanged a juridico-political phenomenon (*homo sacer*'s capacity to be killed but not sacrificed) for a genuinely religious phenomenon is the root of all equivocations that have marked studies both of the sacred and of sovereignty in our time.⁴

Here the characteristic feature of Western discourse has been the politicization of life. The sacred is thus not an exclusively religious sphere but is crucial to the body politic as a realm transposed into the legal system. The sacred is the state of the exception, and biological life understood in these terms becomes bare life and identified with the exception, and the exception is the *homo sacer*. Sovereignty as the embodiment of state power, whether invested from below in a Hobbesian manner or derived from above in a Divine Right of Kings way, defines and controls the sacred, which means that sovereign power defines the state of the exception and so bare life. We might say that bare life is the politicization of life itself under the sign of sovereign power.

p. 347 In the Hobbesian tradition of political philosophy sovereign power lies in the sovereign in whom the people invest their trust. In exchange for loyalty and obedience, the sovereign protects the people and creates a functioning order for the maximal prosperity of citizens. Conformity to sovereign power is the price paid to ensure that society does not revert to the state of nature, a state of war, in which life, to use his famous phrase, is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'.⁵ This is the Hobbesian social contract *avant la lettre*. The body politic functions through investment in sovereignty, whether this be dictator, king, or democracy, so long as citizens obey and conform to sovereign dictate. Sovereign power is articulated through law that, in Esposito's terms, ensures the survival of the community and functions like an immune ↴ system in the body.⁶ Hobbes has an essentially pessimistic (some would say realistic) view of human nature that the human natural state is at war, driven by mimetic desire (of course, he did not use that Girardian phrase but describes the same thing).⁷ The health of the social body is ensured by sovereign power that rules both secular state and church, ensuring obedience through law.

Thus, for Hobbes, humanity's natural condition is brutal unless controlled and transformed by politics. People's desire for peace can only be assured by the sovereign's iron fist. Hobbes' is no overt philosophy of life, but the body politic is nevertheless an organic unity in which each part plays a role and contributes to the overall health of the body. Indeed, Esposito reasonably suggests that with Hobbes the question of life embeds itself within political theory and practice, even that with modernity 'life brings into being or "invents" modernity as the complex of categories capable of answering the question of the preservation of life'.⁸ But there is no Christian spirit animating the body politic and indeed Hobbes rejects the idea of a top-down transference of power from God to sovereign; rather, power is bestowed upwards to the monarch from the citizens. This is the birth of the modern conception of the state, one in which the vision is not so much repair as construction. Hobbes is not concerned with the animating principle of the body politic but only with its function, namely to prevent a reversal or regression to the state of nature, which is the state of war, and thereby institutes a biopolitics to control life.

p. 348 This model was to prove fundamental in centuries following Hobbes, both in the political actualizations of sovereign power in the coming centuries and in political theorizing, a fundamentally Hobbesian worldview coming again to the fore in the politics of Carl Schmitt in the twentieth century. Schmitt follows Hobbes in his assessment of human nature as conflictual; indeed, conflict and potential violence are inherent in the human condition and so politics itself cannot be stripped of warlike elements. Politics as the conflictual realm of human interaction reflects the conflictual nature of life, a view that draws on the Christian, and particularly Catholic, view of original sin: humanity is fallen to a state of nature characterized by violence.⁹ In this pessimism life itself is characterized as energy, certainly, but a violent energy that seeks domination over the other. The secular politics of power is a ↴ transformation of a theological ontology of sin. Realistic politics, thinks Schmitt, is not irenic but assertive of human proclivity to violence that needs to be controlled through the state, through the mechanism of dictatorship. Even democracy contains elements of dictatorship defined as the capacity for the sovereign to decide the state of the exception.

Thus, the creation of biopolitics, the politicization of life, is a feature of modernity whose roots are in Hobbes, but that comes to articulation especially in Nietzsche for whom, as Esposito remarks, life is the sole subject and object of politics as the will to power.¹⁰ Foucault develops the analysis of the history of

biopolitics, describing how natural life comes to be included within state power at the beginnings of modernity and through that control of the biological health of a nation, it becomes possible for the state to both 'protect life and to order a holocaust'.¹¹ Who is defined in terms of bare life is a politico-legal decision that has played out so disastrously in the history of the twentieth century. The Jews and others were relegated to the category of bare life with terrible consequences of the state privileging death as the primary mode of the category, and so bringing bare life close to nihilism. The dark, autochthonous vitalism of National Socialism partly derived from Nietzsche's affirmation of life becomes in the end an affirmation only of death and a triumph of machinic efficacy: the final triumph of death and nothingness over life and in Heideggerian terms, ironically as he initially supported the National Socialist vision, the triumph of *technē* over organism. The philosophy of life turns into the practice of death. In Esposito's words, Nazism was 'the realisation of biology' as the apex of 'a thanatopolitical drift'.¹²

Relevant to this analysis is a volume that stands behind Foucault, and is cited by him, namely *The Productive Body* by Guéry and Deleule. These authors present an analysis of the way in which capitalism has appropriated the body—and we might read this as life itself—into its mode of production. They argue that there are three bodies: the biological, the social, and the productive. Capitalism harnesses the labour-power inherent within the biological body through incorporating it into a social body by means of a productive body. In this process of appropriation, the social body is in fact diminished in the sense that capitalism replaces socialization with a ↵ privatization of social functions.¹³ Capitalism creates a productive body by eliminating the social nature of work and the social nature of the body, thereby creating an individualized biological body. This reduction of a tripartite scheme that was historically the case, into a binary opposition of productive and biological bodies, disconnects individuals from a sense of shared identity that might resist exploitation by capitalism. Indeed the term 'capitalism' is itself derived from the Latin *capitulum* or *caput*, 'head', thereby indicating the head as the seat of knowledge held by managers to control the body of the workers from whom collective knowledge has been taken away.¹⁴ Thus the biological body is 'produced as an autonomous body trapped in the workings of the productive body in its machinified representation'.¹⁵ On this account, one that Foucault also takes up, the natural body becomes codified with machine-like qualities in a system geared up for maximal economic production (and so maximal profits). The individual, biological body is overcoded with a value system that sees it in terms of productivity rather than any intrinsic worth and in which the non-productive body must, inevitably, be set aside. The Guild, in Marxist terms, is the earliest manifestation of this system in which each biological body is 'machinified',¹⁶ a process that continues to the full flowering of capitalism where the biological body is a cog in the machine comprising productive bodies.¹⁷

Foucault was to describe the absorption of the biological body into the productive body, and its consequent machinization in capitalism, as the ordering of the body through regimes of power that are also systems of knowledge, in which politics becomes biopolitics. With the increased power of the state there is an increased concern of sovereign power for the health of the population and the political control of the biological body,¹⁸ which has positive consequences for the productive body of capitalism and the maximizing of profit.

Now clearly the inscribing of the biological body by sovereign power to produce the productive body is not the development of dark vitalism per se, but arguably is the precondition for it. The way regimes of health were promoted in National Socialism for the appropriate body can be contrasted with the denigration of the non-Aryan body and the denial of any life force flowing within it. But the denigration and finally destruction of the non-Aryan body in regimes of machinic efficiency exhibit a laudation of death that contradicts and undermines the affirming of any life principle by the state. In Agamben's terms, sovereign power's relegating the non-Aryan body to the state of the exception, the one who can be killed without committing homicide, is the triumph of nihilism over life. The state is the harbinger of death and there are no higher ↵ values here than pure force. The body politic has become not the organic whole of Hobbes but a machine-like mechanism of oppression in which technology is violence against life.

Homo Sacer

We can see Agamben's bare life as a negative consequence of a Nietzschean drive for life. Nietzsche's celebratory Dionysian impulse strips down human life to that bare impulse and thereby opens the *apolitical* drive for life itself to becoming absorbed or colonized by a *political* drive to bring all within its remit: in Agamben's terms, the politicization of *zoē* through *bios*. This is the production of bare life that stands outside the law while at the same time being included in the law as the state of the exception. Furthermore, this is the production of sacred life, the *homo sacer*, who as the state of the exception can be killed without homicide being committed. Agamben traces this in Roman law to a statement by a Pompeius Festus who says that 'it is not permitted to sacrifice this man, and yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide'.¹⁹

While the production of the state of the exception is understandable, what then of the prohibition on sacrifice? Why should the one who is in the state of exception, vulnerable to death without murder, be excluded from the sacrifice? This has been the topic of some debate. On the one hand, some scholars, such as Mommsen and Bennett, see this idea of sacrality as a leftover from an earlier time when capital punishment was regarded as a sacrifice to the gods: penal and religious law were not yet distinguished. On the other, there are those such as Kerényi who argue that sacred man cannot be sacrificed by virtue of already belonging to the gods; the sacred man cannot be consecrated because he is already in the divine realm. Agamben points out that the first group of scholars can account for the idea of *impune occidi*, being killed without the culpability of homicide, but this cannot account for the prohibition on sacrifice, while the second group of scholars cannot account for why he can be killed with impunity.²⁰ Agamben's account tries to resolve the dilemma through arguing for the political nature of *homo sacer* before any distinction between sacred and profane, in which *homo sacer* already belongs to God and so is not sacrificeable, yet is part of the community in being able to be killed. This is the 'sovereign sphere' in which the sovereign has the power to create the *homo sacer*, the state of exception (and so the *homo sacer* cannot be sacrificed by virtue of already belonging to the divine law, *ius divinum*), and ↵ in which all men can act as sovereigns in their capacity to kill the *homo sacer* without culpability (and so he belongs to human law, *ius humanum*).²¹

On this view, the sacredness of life is an idea formed in an originary political context of sovereign power that decides the state of the exception. Sacrality is not inherent in life itself but is constructed within the political order as the demonstration of sovereign power. The sacrality of life seen in the figure of the *homo sacer* is constructed and constituted within the context of political power and the early formation of rules of human conduct. This political understanding of sacrality is a critique of apolitical views such as Rudolf Otto for whom sacrality was confined to the psychological realm of emotion,²² and is also distinguished from anthropological accounts that see sacrality in terms of prohibition or taboo. Clearly the anthropological notion of taboo is operative in the case of the *homo sacer* who is imbued with good and bad sacred power in the sense of being both divine and polluting, but it is the political origin in the state of the exception that is most important here, not simply as a historical analysis but because it has had modern political impact in the notion of 'the camp'. The camp is the 'biopoliticization of life',²³ a phrase Agamben takes from Karl Löwith who observed how totalitarian states in the twentieth century—Marxist Russia, Fascist Italy, National Socialist Germany—politicize 'even the life that had until then been private'.²⁴

But even bourgeois, liberal democracies have a concern with biopolitics, and the ease with which democracies turned into totalitarian states and totalitarian governments into democracies is explained, says Agamben, by the focus on bare life. Indeed, he traces a history from the Magna Carta (1215), which says that 'no free man (*homo liber*)' may be placed outside the law, to the 1679 writ of *habeas corpus* in which 'free man' has become replaced by 'body' (*corpus*). That is, 'body X' by whatever name must appear before the court, so 'you will have a body to show' (*habeas corpus ad subjiciendum*) becomes the central legal foundation of democratic law.²⁵ This, claims Agamben, is the way that even modern democracies take bare

life and attribute it to each individual and the body becomes the central metaphor of political community from Hobbes' *Leviathan*, bearing both liberty and rights as well as being subjected to sovereign power, being subjected to the capacity to be killed.²⁶

p. 352 Here lies the potential for decisions about life worthy of being lived or otherwise, exposing the underlying logic that allows democracies to become totalitarian states that determine which life can be lived and which life is to be eliminated. Thus, National Socialism's relegation of particular bodies or types of body to bare life is simply the converse of the relegation of particular bodies to the ideology of fullness and health. If originally life and politics were distinct, linked together by the state of the exception, by bare life, then the history of totalitarianism—in Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, and, we might add, Mao's China—brings them together such that, in Agamben's words, 'all life becomes sacred and all politics becomes the exception'.²⁷ Within the philosophy of National Socialism, life, or rather 'good' life as determined and controlled by the state, defines its opposite as the 'bad' life that can be exterminated with impunity. The vitalism that this ideology draws on is thus a dark vitalism and brings the affirmation of life in the affirmation of death. In this dark vitalism—whose impulse is indeed traceable to Nietzsche, although he is simply an articulate exemplum of forces deep within the juridico-political structure of the West—there is no value outside of life itself, there is no transcendent value in either a Gnostic or a theistic narrative. In contemporary terms, bare life—the simple fact of being born—comes to be the arena of biopolitics in which genetic control becomes the site of political contestation, as we have seen. The philosophy of life becomes a dark philosophy of life because the vital force is seen to be exclusive with degrees of intensity linked to degrees of value for the state: thus life developed from the purity of blood and earth comes to be accorded high value, defined in contradistinction to the low value of the 'degenerate' other defined both racially ('Jewish blood') and politically (Socialist ideology).

p. 353 That the biological body can be colonized by the state and relegated to bare life and the state of exception so easily is an indication for Agamben of the proximity of democracy to totalitarianism. The sacrality of life is political gesture created with modernity and the move towards secularization. The person is overdetermined as biological life and politically formed either as citizen or as bare life. The creation of bare life or the *homo sacer* is ironically the de-sacralization of the person and the complete objectification of the body as owned by the state: I am reminded of Kafka's terrible story of the machine that executes criminals by inscribing their crime on their body.²⁸ The Agamben view charts a dark vitalism and a de-humanization. It is because of this stripping a person down to bare life that the *homo sacer* cannot be sacrificed because sacrifice entails, on the contrary, that the victim take on the sins of the sacrifice or community and so must proximate to the human in some way. Hence in Bataille's Aztecs the human sacrificial victim has to be brought within the realm of intimacy, within the realm of human life to take on the properties necessary for cathartic expulsion through sacrificial violence. Similarly, with the Christ figure, which Agamben does not address, we have the Roman state creating Jesus as the state of exception and stripping him to bare life. But here the body condemned through Roman judicial order is overcoded with the Christian vision and so set up as the counterpart of bare life. The *homo sacer* is not outside of the sacrifice in this case, but is regarded as the sacrifice of all sacrifice, in fact to redeem the biological body and to question the very secular power that had attempted to de-humanize the body in the judicial process. There is then an alternative vision.

So much for the analysis of the conditions under which the politicization of life itself can turn into a dark vitalism, but what are the discourses that counter this? A purely negative, political sacrality as the dark side of a secular age does not go unchallenged. On the one hand, we have a still secular discourse of an emergent vital materialism linked to environmental concerns that we examined in Chapter 9. On the other hand, we have a theological discourse that is both critical of dark vitalism and affirmative of life through its grounding in a Christian metaphysics and the highlighting of the person in relation to life: persona as the consequence of life itself and Christ as *homo sacer* redeems through disrupting the category in being

understood as the one who can and must be sacrificed. The redemption of bare life and its transformation through death and the proposed resurrection of Jesus provides a counter-narrative to a purely secular history.

This is to see sacredness not as bare life or the politicization of biological life, but as integral to the nature of the person as a participant in a trans-political order. The trans-political is not non-political, as Christian theological participation in an order of sacrality that goes beyond the contingencies of human power relationships includes those relationships within it. Carl Schmitt's political theological project, whose analysis of sovereign power integrates so well with Agamben's, is not representative of mainstream theological thinking on the matter of life. Rather, the Christian project has been participative in a sacred order beyond the human—in pre-modernity it has been fundamentally cosmological—and yet has been imbued and implicated within human political life. Taubes is surely right in his characterization of Paul and in identifying the fundamentally political nature of Paul's project, a project that embodies the idea of a transformed state with the realization of Christian eschatology along with an evangelizing imperative inspired by the life of the spirit. The Christian theological narrative is affirmative of life itself and both implicitly and explicitly critical of state power that through the centuries has attempted to control it. The biopolitics analysed by Foucault and Agamben, and even Arendt, is a site of resistance in Christian theology where the sacredness of life is not defined by the secular state, as Agamben's *homo sacer*, but is rather defined by transcendence beyond it: by the God who creates *ex nihilo*. The Christian affirmation of life is thus set against secularization and de-humanization of human life and also against the Gnostic narrative that negatively evaluates the world.

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Grace and Nature

Within modern Christian theology the ordering of the political realm has taken the form of argument against secular politics and humanist atheism, and political theology has also set itself against the dark vitalism and relegation of the body to bare life that Agamben has so astutely analysed. De Lubac, living through the dark vitalism of National Socialism in France, perceived that Christian theology needed to go beyond rationalism or 'extrinsicism'²⁹ and return to the sources of the Catholic tradition, a *ressourcement* to the Fathers of the Church and to medieval exegesis. De Lubac presents a Christian vision in which secular bare life could not occur because of the sacrality of life pervaded by the supernatural order and by grace, and offers an analysis of how a purely secular narrative developed (that could give rise to bare life). Moving to a machinic understanding of life, in terms discussed above, to a transformation of the biological body into the productive body, secularism misses the sacrality of life understood as participation.

De Lubac thought that Catholic theology had become divorced from everyday concerns and irrelevant to those concerns because it was focused on Neo-Scholasticism, simply a commentary on Thomas Aquinas, which, in de Lubac's view, had widened the gap between the sacred and the everyday, between grace and nature. One of de Lubac's key, if controversial, texts is *Surnaturel*.³⁰ In this book published in 1946 he argued that the distinction between the supernatural and the natural, that maps on to the distinction between the realms of grace and nature, had meant that theology had in a sense given up on the natural order through focusing on the supernatural. Such relinquishing of a realm of discourse in favour of a kind of transcendence from the seventeenth century had meant that theology developed an 'extrinsic' approach and allowed the gap thereby created to be filled by secular philosophy and secular political philosophy, such as that of Hobbes and Locke.³¹ On the contrary, as creatures we are inseparably participant in creation as essential to our nature; creation is not simply an extrinsic fact, but our essence. De Lubac writes:

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Forgetting, or at least not fully realizing our situation as creatures, we reason more or less as if creation were only a fact, the pure extrinsic condition of our origin, and not our essence.³²

Theology thus has a healing task of making us aware of how we are integrated within creation and the inseparability of grace and nature; that life is nature and the supernatural interpenetrated.

The relinquishing of the secular realm by Catholic theology had meant its becoming increasingly irrelevant to mainstream political and philosophical discourse in the secular world. On this view, the church is there to save souls and as a consequence had neglected the concerns of everyday life. This, following the Catholic philosopher Maurice Blondel, is what is meant by extrinsicism,³³ a theology extrinsic to the needs of everyday human concerns. An alternative could be presented in which the supernatural pervades the natural: life itself comes to express its divine source. This *nouvelle théologie*, an ironic title in that it wished to return to the Christian sources in the Church Fathers and to medieval exegesis of scripture, presented the affirmation of the everyday through claiming that participation in the divine realm shows in the inseparability of nature and grace. The separation of nature and grace in Neo-Scholasticism is a dualistic ontology for de Lubac that distinguishes too rigidly the natural ends of human life through humanity's own efforts from the supernatural end of life formed through grace.³⁴

p. 356 Sin has harmed nature, but this can be healed through supernatural beatitude and participation for de Lubac, which is a return to a view prior to the sixteenth century in which grace, the supernatural realm, penetrated into nature. Theology after the sixteenth century wished to maintain that human nature had its own natural end in contrast to the beatific vision that was a supernatural end, freely given through grace. There is a 'pure nature' quite distinct from the supernatural realm of grace. If the two realms were conflated, this meant a kind of compulsion on grace to grant the beatific vision. By contrast, de Lubac rejects this view on the grounds that the dignity of the human needs to be protected against nihilism and atheist humanism, showing through his scholarship that the idea of pure nature only develops long after Aquinas in the Thomistic tradition.³⁵ Thus following Blondel, secular historicism, that there is no foundation, is also to be combatted as much as extrinsicism.

For de Lubac, Christian anthropology entails the idea of the supernatural in which the human is made in the image of God.³⁶ This supernature is fundamental to Christian thinking and articulates the idea of the Spirit that in Pauline terms is called *pneumatikos*,³⁷ thereby linking the supernatural to the idea of life itself as understood in the early Christian sources. The supernatural, as being intrinsic to life itself because it pervades nature, lays stress on a more tactile or material understanding of grace that de Lubac's friend and fellow Jesuit Teilhard de Chardin called 'physicism'.³⁸ The importance here lies in the idea that the supernatural does not simply elevate nature, but transforms it.³⁹ On this view, the central Christian message is the transformation of creation from a state of fallenness, to use Christian mythological language, and such transformation must inevitably be political because it is concerned with human affairs and the 'natural' transactions of people.

Thus, in contrast to the bare life that is produced through a secular political ideology in which life itself is colonized by a *bios* that actually strips it of any human features, de Lubac's supernatural imbues life with divine power and functions against the danger of relegating the political purely to nature and thereby divorcing it from any moral vision. Moral vision is not really the language of de Lubac, but rather, in the more robust language of Christian salvation, he writes that the 'darksome' and 'sinful drama' of humanity can be healed through the supernatural intervention of Calvary, which is actually a return of humanity to life.⁴⁰ The formation of bare life and its consequent horror can be counteracted according to this Christian paradigm by the transformation of life itself in the salvific act of the sacrifice of Christ, translated into the political arena that is part of nature. Through colonizing nature, supernature means that transcendence is always present in human life and moves against a de-humanizing secularization in which human life can become merely bare life in what de Lubac would see as a corruption of life itself.

p. 357 The intrinsic desire for a supernatural end is a characteristic feature of the human, a longing to see God that is the necessary condition for civilization ↳ resulting from it; the necessary impetus to transform human

life both in the personal realm and in political reality. Human beings have a supernatural finality imprinted on their natures, an orientation towards a final end,⁴¹ which can be read as the sanctification of life itself. Thus, for de Lubac the crucial redemptive structure for human hope is the church that expresses God's grace and performs through history the resurrection.⁴² It is this structure and institution that can prevail against the de-humanization of secularism and its anti-foundationalism, a process analysed by Agamben that results in the transformation of democracy into totalitarianism, and it must do this through privileging the idea of the person.

Christian Anthropology

In Christian, and especially Catholic, anthropology the centrality of the institution of the church is complemented by the centrality of the sanctity of the person. With de Lubac's non-dualism between nature and grace, the supernatural pervading the natural, the person participates in God who is the source of life. The centrality of person militates against de-humanization and locates human beings within an environment, within an *Umwelt*, that is orientated towards their support. This Christian anthropocentrism contrasts with a vitalism that sanctifies all of nature—as we see in the affirmation of nature in work by thinkers such as Donna Haraway—but that has the potential to become the dark vitalism so devastatingly well articulated in the twentieth century. The Christian vision of the de Lubacian kind places the person redeemed through Christ at the centre of a cosmology characterized by love.⁴³ This is a covert political theology that affirms a Christian philosophy of life. Privileging the centrality of the person is to promote a stance against any state totalitarianism that seeks to demote the person in the interests of sovereign power. The affirmation of the person against its totalitarian eradication becomes an overt political act, as we have seen with so many examples from Etty Hilsom to Dietrich Bonhoeffer or, perhaps less dramatically but nevertheless poignantly, in the affirmation of the person against bureaucratization as depicted, for example, in the films of Ken Loach, especially *I, Daniel Blake*.

p. 358 In the de Lubacian view, the person comes to the fullness of life through a participative ontology in which my being as person has its fulfilment in the being of the Christ, specifically in the resurrection, articulated through the church in the Eucharistic transformation. Person, on this view, is less individualistic and more subjective in the sense that participation in Christ is an intensification of life itself and the development of a Christian-specific inwardness that is intensely personal while simultaneously transcending personality or ego in a mystical ascent.⁴⁴ But even without the language of inwardness, Christian anthropology presents a view focused on the experience of life lived in the world—as Spaemann says, who develops this line of thinking, 'what it means to be alive is something we know from experience'.⁴⁵ With the person at the centre of a Christian ontology, life itself becomes personalized in a way that always resists reduction to bare life. For Spaemann, 'we experience what it is to live' when we experience life as our being, and 'to have life is what it is to be a person'.⁴⁶ Experiencing life, a person has a different sense of sacredness to the grim legalism of the *homo sacer*. In a pre-modern cosmic Christianity, the person participates in a cosmos imbued with the life of Christ and it is this sense of participative sacrality that is lost with modernity and the retreat of religion from cosmology that is replaced by mechanistic science and mechanistic body. But with thinkers such as de Lubac, and even more so with his friend Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity offers a participative ontology in which the person is given an intensity of life through grace that pervades nature. But this participation does not mean the eradication of the person, and one reading of Christianity wishes to maintain a strong personalism in which each is unique with a single name, 'a name which only one person bears and God alone knows'.⁴⁷ To see this structure of grace is to see history in terms of a narrative of fall and redemption, the central Christian narrative, that for Christianity is a 'true myth' in which the violence of history as we see articulated in the *homo sacer* is challenged ironically by the violence of the cross that is actually an irenic gesture 'to repair the things that have been broken', to paraphrase Walter Benjamin.⁴⁸ The secular violence of the *homo sacer* when read from the Christian theological perspective is the negation of

life itself as gift. De Lubac's emphasis on participation and Spaemann's focus on the person are within the sphere of a political theology that challenges the secular narrative that is in danger of falling into nihilism, as we see with the *homo sacer*. As Milbank has highlighted, Christianity confronts a purely secular politics with a vision of life that is transformative, offering an alternative to a politics resting purely on power, the power of the strong over the weak.⁴⁹ In the Christian vision, life is inherently ethical, as Ward points out, intrinsic to the nature of creation and not simply an add-on to bare life.⁵⁰ In the Christian story, a political theology offers critique of secular politics in which power can create the *homo sacer* and that looks to a denouement at the end of history.

A Christian anthropology is therefore a philosophy of life that is also necessarily a political theology. In a fundamentally Christian structure, three terms are important in their interrelationship: life (related to *pneuma*, spirit), being (related to cosmos), and gift (of Christ to the world). Underlying this structure is the idea of God as the perfection of goodness and the supremacy of 'good' over 'right', a view that entails a participation in a cosmic order, a view that Milbank following de Lubac has developed.⁵¹ Here participation means a community of individuals focused on the transformation of life that the church sees as enabled through Christ's resurrection, the central idea of all Christian churches. That is, participation is the true spirit of Christian faith rather than the dry extrinsicism of believing a set of propositions, a view that is decidedly modernist and counter to the traditional understanding. Both extrinsicism and historicism in the de Lubacian view are against the tradition and do not embrace the full implication of the resurrection.

The Resurrection of the Body

The argument against extrinsicism and for participation can be seen in particular with regard to the central Christian dogma of the resurrection. The literature on this is vast, but Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment modernity has inevitably struggled with the doctrine, and its claim to Christian uniqueness in the face of a plurality of religions has been an ongoing issue. But the death on the cross and resurrection of Christ is central to the logic of Christianity: as the Orthodox Easter homily of John Chrysostom declares: 'Christ is risen from the Dead, by death hath he trampled down death, and on those in the graves hath bestowed life'.⁵² Stanley Spencer's *The Resurrection, Cookham* shows the dead climbing out of the graves in an English country churchyard, an eschaton enabled in Christian belief through the death and bodily resurrection of Christ. But as Karl Rahner asks, what do we really mean by the resurrection of the body?⁵³

There is a range of views on this, the central mystery of Christianity, all of which implicate human history in a history of salvation. For Rahner, the resurrection means the 'the termination and perfection of the whole man before God, which gives him "eternal life"'.⁵⁴ This termination of history is not really conceivable other than in vague terms as 'the perfection and total achievement of saving history',⁵⁵ but it is the endpoint towards which creation is moving and the fulfilment of life that has been enabled by the resurrection of Christ. Christ, as it were, paves the way for universal redemption in which life overcomes death. In the New Testament account, shortly after the resurrection, Christ ascends to heaven, iconographically depicted as Christ emanating a glorious light that blinds the disciples. In the words of de Bérulle quoted by de Lubac, Christ received from the Father a body 'far more glorious than the sun' that contains 'within its immense grandeur both earth and sun, all the stars and all the expanse of the heavens, a body that rules all bodies and all heavenly spirits', an image that resonates with Teilhard's cosmic vision of Christ as the omega point.⁵⁶ In this ascension into heaven in de Bérulle's terms, Christ becomes light and expands to the limit of the universe, thereby transforming the world such that humanity can follow in Christ's wake: we too will become light in a new creation.

The resurrection of the body is the central Christian metaphor and believed spiritual truth that stands as a bulwark against a purely secular understanding of history and the denigration of life, made possible

through the dark vitalism that is its consequence. The resurrection signifies the transformation of the world and of the person, offering a deep eschatological hope for those within the paradigm. Echoing Rahner, Oliver Davies asks, ‘where is Jesus Christ now?’⁵⁷ Davies answers this by returning to the distinction between the resurrection and the ascension, the latter doctrine having been somewhat neglected in Christian ↳ theology since the sixteenth century.⁵⁸ Christ ascended reaches a boundary of cosmic possibility and we might say in this theology, the ascended Christ becomes coterminous with life itself. For Thomas Aquinas the ascended Christ was at the highest point of heaven and for us, now that we know so much more about the physical universe, that highest point is at the boundary of the known,⁵⁹ the boundary that is total light.

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This cosmological retrieval of Christ as transformed into the universe contains an implicit political theology in which Christ ascended represents the transformation of the world and the negation of negation: the affirmation of life transformed is the negation of bare life and the assertion of a different kind of sacrality in which the person could never be stripped to bare life. The state machine implied by bare life and the reduction of the biological body to the productive body is inveighed against in the Christian narrative that seeks to speak truth to power. While we must acknowledge how the Christian voice has so often been used in the interests of state power to oppress and even to render others into a state of slavery, the heart of the political theology articulated by Paul is one of affirmation of spirit that is affirmation of life in the hope of resurrection, a message renewed through its history in which tradition can itself be read as subversion.⁶⁰

The psychoanalyst Norman Brown observes that the resurrected body is the transfigured body, a body reconciled with death.⁶¹ Brown comments that the specialty of Christian theology is its rejection of the Platonic view of the body—a rejection of what I have called the Gnostic narrative—in favour of the affirmation of the body in an eternal life. Eternal life can only be in the body according to the Christian narrative, and it is Jacob Boehme who takes up the theme, seeing death not as nothing ‘but as positive force either in dialectical conflict with life (in fallen man), or dialectically unified with life (in God’s perfection)’.⁶² In Brown’s reading of Boehme, he sees the affirmation of life itself as the affirmation of play and a resolution of anxiety and neurosis because of the necessity to accept life as life in the body, a view that later Protestantism represses (along with Boehme’s writings). This acceptance—one might add joyful acceptance for Boehme—of the life of the body is simultaneously an acceptance of death. This tradition of bodily affirmation according to Brown runs from Luther to Boehme and thence to the poets Blake and Novalis, Goethe, and even Hopkins and Rilke, and one should add ↳ the philosophers Hegel, Berdyaev, and even Freud.⁶³ For Brown, a psychoanalytic reading of the Christian theme means that the resurrection of the body as an idea is the affirmation of life, of Eros, but an affirmation that can only occur with the acceptance of death, of Thanatos. In a sense Brown’s version of the resurrection is an attempt to offer a secular view of resurrection as a symbol that nevertheless has the power to move against the political colonization of life itself to produce bare life. The joy and affirmation of the resurrected body is the affirmation of a civilization that has reduced collective anxiety and neurosis in the affirmation of a secular sacred against nihilism.

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This is certainly a weaker version of the transformed body, the resurrected body, than the mainstream Christian one, relegating it to the realm of metaphor and imagination, albeit a real imagination that has effects in material reality. But clearly Brown understands the image—or we might say the icon—of the resurrected body as a necessary force against bare life, a counter to the secular sacred of *homo sacer*, and a secular alternative to the theistic vision. Brown recognizes the need in modernity to counteract the nihilistic desire for death with the positivistic force of life, but in contrast to the Christian strong ontology of the resurrection can only offer a weak ontology, but perhaps an ontology that because of its weakness has wider appeal in a secular age. The Christian solution to *homo sacer* that meets bare life with the resurrection of the body is a political theology that may have wider appeal in many areas of the globe, but in the North Atlantic meets with scepticism in the secular, democratic faith that democratic institutions through law, along with a culture of human rights, will be robust enough to resist any future attempts for politics to revert to a

politics of bare life. When Freud left Vienna in 1939—writing ironically, ‘I can most highly recommend the Gestapo to anyone’ in a document he was made to sign⁶⁴—he could reflect that the analysis of repression had not been enough to prevent the mass tide of de-humanization and scapegoating. But then neither had the Christian resurrection of the body been enough, and it could be argued that civilization needed to enshrine human self-repair in institutions legally regulated. The United Nations legislation concerning the global implementation of human rights might be seen as a gesture towards this.

p. 363 The resurrection of the body is a powerful idea and image, translated as political theology that stands against any secular de-humanization of life. Of course, there is no guarantee that political theology does not produce de-humanization—the history of Christianity is replete with such examples— but it can function in the contemporary world as a counterfoil to totalitarian de-humanization and the reduction of life to bare life that we have seen so abundantly on a mass scale in the twentieth century. But the Christian vision, while claiming universality, cannot function as theology in a global, mostly secular political context. The affirmation of life itself that we see in the strong theology of the resurrection comes to be replaced by covert political theologies, especially in Asia where religion functions as a force for political change. Thus in the complexity of a contemporary global history of ideas, we have life itself coming to articulation in a spiritual-material environmentalism, a popular retrenchment against this in a return to fundamentalist Christianity, and a covert Asian vitalism as critique of sovereign power manifested in a number of local religious movements such as Daoist possession cults in South-East Asia.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Islam as a global political force stands at an angle to these developments, taking the form of anti-democratic values that it sees as counter to the sacred order of life. How all this will play out on the world stage has yet to be seen.

Political theology is a category that has developed within the Abrahamic religions. Arguably Islam is inherently political, and we cannot separate the ‘spiritual’ and ‘political’ in a worldview that has such concern with the way we live our lives and the imperative of correct governance in consonance with God’s perceived law. Judaism likewise has a concern with the political and governance under God’s law, although here the concern is with the in-group and is non-universalizing; indeed, it is universalism that ends up with the evil of the holocaust, and life affirmation in Germanic vitalism ironically ends in the affirmation of death through stripping life to bare life. With Christianity, theologies of life have intersected with mainstream theology as we have seen, from Paul to Aquinas, but here there has always been the ‘Mary’ option of following a path of life focused purely on spiritual development to the neglect of the ‘Martha’ option of engaging with secular politics. Life force in Asia is a different story, with Daoist ideas influencing the Confucian court in China, and in India the vitalism of yoga becoming a political force in post-independence Indian polity.

p. 364 In one of his last books, *The Nomos of the Earth*, Carl Schmitt presented a history of the global order rooted in Europe and the discovery of the New World. This is an optimistic work that argues for establishing a world order based on international law that has come out of a European context of Occidental rationalism that produced the sovereign state, an important European achievement.⁶⁶ Leaving aside the historical question about whether Europe is unique in coming up with the sovereign state—it could be argued that China established itself as a united polity long before—the major point of Schmitt’s text is to argue that the USA is the main force for global order, a view that is resonant sixty years or more after its publication.

Political theology that taps into the life energy of civilization—as Stravinsky’s *Rite of Spring* might be said to have done on the eve of the First World War—has come to be relevant to discourse once again, but this time not only a Christian political theology but implicit political theologies that operate at local levels, especially in Asia, that come to be highly relevant in shaping global politics. I have here attempted to articulate a problem that lies at the heart of Western views of life, namely the secular creation of sacrality in the *homo sacer* identified by Agamben, and I have shown how Christianity offered a counter-narrative through the affirmation of life itself in the resurrection of the body; an anticipation of fullness and the healing of the entire cosmos through a participation in a trans-human order. But this is not enough for a contemporary

pluralist world in which we see the need for political institutions to address the affirmation of life and desire for life itself. The history of civilizations expresses a history that sustains and reinforces the human proclivity to assert life, and for institutions to articulate the impulses of life and the need to control those impulses through law and narrative. It is to this transformational structure, rooted in the kind of beings that we are, to which we finally need to turn.

Notes

- 1 This chapter is derived in part from an article published in *Religion*, 'The Political Sacred and the Holiness of Life Itself', *Religion*, vol. 47 (4), 2018, pp. 688–703.
- 2 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. David Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 1.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 85.
- 5 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited with notes by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge: Hackett, 1994), p. 76.
- 6 Roberto Esposito, *Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life*, trans. Zakiya Hanafi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 21. See also J. Sørensen, 'Religion, Evolution, and an Immunology of Cultural Systems', *Evolution and Cognition*, vol. 10 (1), 2004, pp. 61–73.
- 7 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 75: 'if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies'.
- 8 Roberto Esposito, Rhiannon Welch, and Vanes Lemm, *Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), p. 70.
- 9 Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
- 10 Esposito et al., *Terms of the Political*, p. 72. See also Roberto Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy C. Campbell (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), on 'thanatopolitics' and eugenics (p. 115).
- 11 Foucault, *Dits et écrits* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), vol. 3, p. 719, quoted by Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 3.
- 12 Esposito et al., *Terms of the Political*, pp. 72–3. Nikolas Rose also makes a point that contemporary emphasis on human corporeality is 'to free ourselves from an overly intellectualist and rationalist account of contemporary politics, economics and culture', in which biology is 'translated into ontology, ontology is transmuted into politics', a move which 'should give us pause'. Nikolas Rose, 'The Human Sciences in a Biological Age', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 30 (1), 2013, pp. 3–34.
- 13 François Guéry and Didier Deleule, *The Productive Body*, trans. Philip Barnard and Stephen Shapiro (Winchester and Washington, DC: Zero Books, 2014), p. 51.
- 14 *Ibid.*, pp. 92–5.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 126.
- 18 Foucault, *Dits et écrits*, vol. 3, p. 719
- 19 Cited by Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 71.
- 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 72–3.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 82–4.
- 22 Agamben somewhat caustically remarks: 'That the religious belongs entirely to the sphere of psychological emotion, that it essentially has to do with shivers and goose bumps—this is the triviality that the neologism "numinous" had to dress up as science' (p. 78).
- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 119–25.
- 24 Quoted *ibid.*, p. 121.
- 25 *Ibid.*, pp. 123–4.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 125.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 148.
- 28 Franz Kafka, 'In the Penal Colony', trans. Stanley Corngold, in *Kafka's Selected Stories*, Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton, 2007), pp. 35–59.
- 29 Henri de Lubac, *A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace*, trans. Richard Arnandez (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 1984), pp. 37–41.

- 30 For a good overview of de Lubac's writings on the supernatural see Georges Chantaine, 'Surnaturel et destinée humaine dans la pensée occidentale selon Henri de Lubac', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, vol. 85 (2), 2001, pp. 299–312. For a good discussion of the issue of contextualizing de Lubac in contemporary theology see Bryan C. Hollon, *Everything Is Sacred: Spiritual Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henry de Lubac* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009), pp. 75–94.
- 31 See William Cavanaugh, *Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 19–20.
- 32 Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel: Études Historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946), p. 485: *Oubliant, ou du moins ne réalisant pas à fond notre situation de créatures, nous raisonnons plus ou moins comme si la création n'était qu'un fait, pure condition extrinsèque de notre origine, et non jusqu'à notre essence*. My translation.
- 33 Maurice Blondel, *Action: Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice*, trans. Oliva Blanchette (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2004 (1893)). De Lubac derives his distinction from Blondel. He writes that Blondel 'overcame the opposition between an extrinsicism which ruined Christian thought and an immanentism which ruined the objective mystery which nourishes this thought'. *Nature and Grace*, p. 38.
- 34 Henri de Lubac, *Le surnaturel* (Paris: Vrin, 1946), p. 437. See Brian Daley, 'The Nouvelle Théologie and the Patristic Revival: Sources, Symbols and the Science of Theology', *International Journal of Systematic Theology*, vol. 7, 2005, pp. 362–82.
- 35 De Lubac, *Surnaturel*, p. 487.
- 36 De Lubac, *Nature and Grace*, pp. 17–18.
- 37 *Ibid.*, pp. 26–7.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 81.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 135.
- 41 De Lubac, *Surnaturel*, p. 487.
- 42 De Lubac, *Nature and Grace*, pp. 109–15.
- 43 See Oliver Davies, *Theology of Compassion: Metaphysics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradition* (London: SCM, 2010), p. 77: 'love represents an attempt to re-enact on the temporal plane the immutability of the divine realm: it is an attempt to accomplish on earth the divine *ousia*'; also on the theology of love, Werner Jeanrond, *A Theology of Love* (London: T and T Clark, 2010), pp. 25–44.
- 44 For a more sustained argument see my *The Truth Within: A History of Inwardness in Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 69–101. See also Paul S. Fiddes, *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2000).
- 45 Walter Spaemann, *Persons: The Difference between 'Someone' and 'Something'*, trans. Oliver O'Donovan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 157.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 150.
- 48 Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 249.
- 49 As Milbank says, 'The Cross was a political event and the "apolitical" character of the New Testament signals the ultimate replacement of the coercive *polis* and *imperium*, the structures of ancient society, by the persuasive Church, rather than any withdrawing from a realm of self-sufficient political life'. John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 251.
- 50 Graham Ward, *How the Light Gets in: Ethical Life I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 290–1.
- 51 *Ibid.*, pp. 24–32.
- 52 *A Prayer Book for Orthodox Christians* (Boston, MA: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1987), p. 163.
- 53 Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, vol. 2: *Man in the Church*, trans. Karl H. Kruger (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1963), p. 210.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 213.
- 56 Henri de Lubac, *Teilhard de Chardin, the Man and his Meaning*, trans. Réne Hague (New York: Hawthorn Press, 1964), p. 57.
- 57 Oliver Davies, *Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom, and Christian Act* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 5. For a discussion of the same theme also see Douglas Farrow, *Ascension Theology* (New York: T and T Clark, 2011); Anthony J. Kelly, '"The Body of Christ Amen!" The Expanding Incarnation', *Theological Studies*, vol. 71, 2010, pp. 792–816.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p. 8: 'Even such a conservative doctrinal theologian as Karl Barth tends to conflate the ascended and resurrected Christ'.
- 59 *Ibid.*, pp. 34–57.
- 60 James Hanvey, 'Tradition as Subversion', *International Journal of Systematic Theology*, vol. 6 (1), 2004, pp. 50–68.
- 61 Norman Brown, *Life against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), p.

309.

62 Ibid., p. 310.

63 Ibid., pp. 311–13.

64 Peter Gay, *Freud: A Life for our Times* (London and Melbourne: J.N. Dent and Sons, 1988), p. 628.

65 Kenneth Dean, 'Underworld Rising: The Fragmented Syncretic Ritual Field of Singapore', unpublished paper presented at 'Political Theologies and Development in Asia', Asia Research Institute, NUS, 21 February 2017.

66 Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. G.L. Ulman (New York: Telos Press, 2006).

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